Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 23

Issue 4

Article 4

10-1-2006

God's Goodness Needs No Privilege: A Reply to Funkhouser
Thomas D. Senor

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Senor, Thomas D. (2006) "God's Goodness Needs No Privilege: A Reply to Funkhouser," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 23 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200623437
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol23/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

GOD'S GOODNESS NEEDS NO PRIVILEGE:
A REPLY TO FUNKHOUSER
Thomas D. Senor

According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection
(what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser
gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that,
contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's
attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God
cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed with (i) and
(ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments.

Introduction
In his paper "On Privileging God's Moral Goodness," Eric Funkhouser
argues that the properties of omnipotence and necessary goodness are incompatible. Funkhouser argues further that attempts to solve this problem
have sometimes led theists to mis-define 'omnipotence' and to corrupt "a
pE'rfectly good word." Interestingly, Funkhouser does not take the upshot
of his argument to be that there is something conceptually amiss with the
concept of God, but only with its explication by philosophers of religion.
Funkhouser has no particular beef with the view that God is necessarily
good and has whatever power is consistent with that, provided that such
power is seen to fall short of omnipotence.
I am not persuaded by Funkhouser's argument. I see no philosophical, semantic, or even lexical difficulties in assigning to God the properties of necessary goodness and omnipotence. This paper is an attempt to
explain why.

Section 1: A Brief Aside
Before launching into Funkhouser's argument, I'd like to first note that
while the problem that concerns Funkhouser is indeed a prima facie problem for the compossibility of omnipotence and necessary goodness (or as
Funkhouser sometimes says impeccability), the difficulty can be generated
even on a somewhat weaker conception of divine goodness. The problem
(such as it is) concerns the compatibility of omnipotence with God's being
unable to do certain things because of his "perfect goodness." Let's say a
being is perfectly good if it never violates a moral principle that applies
to it, and if it acts in accordance with all relevant moral principles. Now if
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perfect goodness is an essential property of God, then it follows that there
are no worlds in which God acts against a moral principle, and we are on
our way to generating the incompatibility problem. However, the same
difficulty can be generated even if we think of God's perfect goodness as
stable and not essential. A property P is stable for a being B at a world W
iff (a) B exemplifies P at all times in Wand (b) there is nothing B can do to
make it the case that B ceases to exemplify Pin W. Put somewhat differently, if a person has a property in a stable way, there are no worlds accessible
to her in which she doesn't have it. Exemplifying a property in a stable way
is, for all practical purposes, as limiting as having that property essentially.
For example, suppose that in world WI, Ray has the stable (but accidental)
property of being blind. Then not only does Ray not see-Ray can't see in
WI, even though there are other worlds in which Ray has 20/20 vision.
Now if God's perfect goodness is stable but accidental, then there are
no worlds accessible to God where God violates a principle or fails to act
in accordance with moral principles. Thus there are no worlds accessible
at which God does something wrong, and the prima facie problem at the
heart of Funkhouser's paper is with us even if God's perfect goodness is
not essential.

Section 2: Funkhouser's First Argument
Since his first argument is commendably clear, I won't spend much time
rehearsing it. The fundamental idea is that a necessary condition of being
omnipotent is that it not be possible that there be a being who is able to
do everything you do and more besides. But if God is necessarily good
(or impeccable) then God can't do anything that would violate a moral
principle. Yet we can conceive of a being who is able to do everything God
can do but who lacks impeccability. Such a being would also be able to do
actions that violate moral principles. So such a being would be able to do
everything God can do and then some. But since it is a necessary condition of omnipotence that it is not possible that there is a being who can
do everything an omnipotent being can do and more besides, then God is
not omnipotent.
Later in his paper, Funkhouser offers a second version of the argument
that doesn't depend on the possible existence of a being who can do everything an impeccable God can do and then some. However, in this section
of my paper, I want to focus on the original argument. We'll have a look at
the second version in the next section.
As noted above, Funkhouser's argument depends on this premise:
P3. There is a possible being with the power to bring about all the
states of affairs that God can bring about and then some (e.g. morally
bad states of affairs).
Funkhouser concedes that the Anselmian theist will reject P3. For according to the Anselmian conception of God, God is the greatest possible being, the being with the greatest possible array of the great-making properties. So such a being will exist necessarily and be the most powerful being
at any world at which it exists. l But then it will be the most powerful being
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at every world, so there are no worlds at which there is a being with the
power to bring about the states of affairs that God can bring about and
then some. So there is no such possible being, and P3 is false. Now it might
be that we can conceive of a being that can do everything God can plus
various immoral acts, but this is just an instance of conceivability being a
poor guide to possibility.
Funkhouser thinks this reply is inadequate. Why? Perhaps surprisingly, he aims his response not at the heart of the Anselmian's argument but
instead at her explanation for why the ability to conceive of a person more
powerful than the Anselmian God is not a reliable sign that such a person
is possible. Funkhouser writes:
[T]he typical examples of alleged conceivability-to-possibility failures are different in kind. They involve either a misdescription of a
genuine possibility (e.g., conceiving of watery-stuff as water instead
of the distinct chemical kind XYZ) or a sketchy conception due to
ignorance of scientific or mathematical/logical facts (e.g., conceiving of this exact same physical stuff but without consciousness, or
conceiving of the falsity of Fermat's Last Theorem). My conception
of a being with the powers of God, plus the powers to bring about
immoral states of affairs, fits neither pattern. It does not involve a
misdescription, since I am not assigning any name at all to the being I imagine-I am simply imagining it with certain powers. Nor
does this conception seem to play on any scientific or logical ignorance-How could adding the power to stab the innocent violate a
law of nature or logic? Instead, such a "possibility" is supposed to
be ruled out by some strange, sui generis force of metaphysical necessity. The mind boggles when contemplating the nature of this force
that forestalls the realization of the more-powerful being I imagine.
One could always claim that conceivability is no guarantee of possibility, but for particular cases an explanation of the alleged failure
should be at hand. 2
So Funkhouser agrees that the third premise of his original argument is
true only if the Anselmian conception of God (at least when construed as
demanding the impeccability of God) is logically impossible.
Here's the essence of what I take to be Funkhouser's argument against
Anselmianism:
There is a possible being B who can do everything the Anselmian
God (were one to exist) can do and more besides. So there is a world
W at which B is the most powerful being. But the Anselmian God,
if he exists, is the most powerful being at every world in which he
exists and he is necessarily existent. Since B is the most powerful being in W, the Anselmian God doesn't exist at W, and hence doesn't
exist at any world. His existence is, then, logically impossible. Now
it might be that we can conceive of a being who exists at all worlds
and who is the most powerful being at every world at which he exists but this is just an instance of conceivability being a poor guide
to possibility.
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But what's to stop the Anselmian from using an argument structurally
like Funkhouser's against Funkhouser himself? After all, the Anselmian
can reasonably say that there seems to be nothing incoherent in her concept of a necessary being who is the most powerful being at any world
at which it exists; that is, this is conceivable. And it isn't as though this
conception depends on either a misdescription or ignorance of some fact
of science/math/logic. Therefore, we should think it possible, and any argument for its impossibility must be mistaken. So the Anselmian can give
the following argument that, it seems to me, is on epistemic equal-footing
with Funkhouser's:
There is a possible being, G, who necessarily exists, is impeccable,
and who is the most powerful being at every world at which he exists. There is, then no world at which there is a being, B, who can do
everything the G can do and more besides. That is to say, B's existence is logically impossible. Now it might be that we can conceive of
a being who can do everything G can do and more besides but this is
just an instance of conceivability being a poor guide to possibility.
This argument seems to me at least as good as Funkhouser's. And if we
have a argumentative draw here, then the Anselmian is within her epistemic rights in rejecting premise three of Funkhouser's original argument.
I suggested above that the Anselmian's and Funkhouser's arguments
are equally plausible, but that actually seems to me to be giving too much
credit to the latter. For Funkhouser's argument depends crucially on there
being a very cozy relationship between conceivability and possibility.
Surely the only reason Funkhouser will give for thinking it possible that
there exists a being who can do everything God is thought able to do and
then some is that we can conceive of such a thing. But the theist is unlikely
to claim that her primary reason for thinking that the Anselmian God exists is that she can conceive of it. So conceivability is playing a larger role
in Funkhouser's possibility claim than it is in that of the theist.
We should be wary of claims that, in almost all cases, the conceivable
is possible. For if logical possibility is an objective and fundamental metaphysical category, then it would seem highly surprising if the powers of
conceivability with which God, or Mother Nature, has blessed us would
track the logically possible. One can recognize that, existence proofs aside,
conceivability is the best available guide to possibility. But that doesn't
mean that it is, all things considered and in every context, a good guide.
Particularly when we are considering matters very far from the concerns
of our everyday lives (where it is practically important that we have some
sense of what is possible and what isn't), we should not put too much
stock into the conceptions and mental pictures we can draw as revealing
to us the scope of the possible. 3

Section 3: Funkhouser's Second Argument
Although he stands by his original argument and the truth of its third
premise, Funkhouser recognizes that what he has to say on the matter
is unlikely to convince the Anselmian. So later in his paper he offers a
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version of the argument that does not require that controversial premise. Loosely, the newer version argues that because there are things that
limited beings like humans can do that God cannot (things that do not
themselves depend upon our metaphysical limitations), God is not omnipotent. Humans can and do violate moral principles; God doesn't and
can't. But if there are things that we can do and that God can't, then God
isn't omnipotent.
This version of the argument turns our attention where I think it should
have been all along. The problem isn't that there are possible beings with
more power than God, but only that there are beings with powers that God
lacks (because that means that there are limits to what God can do that
aren't logical limits). If God is impeccable there are things that God can't do
that we would expect an omnipotent being to be able to do, if for no other
reason than that we are able to do them.
] believe that in the first argument and in the second, premise two can
be reasonably resisted. Recall that this premise reads:
2.

God does not have the power to (Le., cannot) bring about morally
bad states of affairs. God is impeccable, or essentially morally good.
(Assumption)

In his defense of 2, Funkhouser argues against the following objection:
from the claim that God is impeccable together with the facts as we know
them, it does follow that there are things God can't do that other possible
and actual individuals can. But, the objector will continue, the reason God
can't do these things is not because God lacks the power to do them but
because God (necessarily) lacks the will to do them. Funkhouser's second
premise mistakenly equates uS cannot X" and "s lacks the power to X."
As it turns out, I think this objection is not as easily dispensed with as
Funkhouser believes.
Let's consider an example of Funkhouser's: God cannot stab an innocent child for no reason. One who accepts impeccability will agree with
Funkhouser that not only will God not do such a thing; God cannot do
such a thing. Funkhouser and I agree on this. But Funkhouser wants to go
from "God cannot do X but others can" to "God is not omnipotent." Now
I grant such an inference is tempting; it is not for nothing that accounts
of omnipotence are often formulated in terms of the ability to perform
actions. Yet I think such accounts are wrong and such an inference is to
be resisted. We can learn something about the nature of power and its relation to intentional action by seeing why power limitations don't follow
from ability limitations.
Suppose we raise the question of whether I can lift the rather large rock
in front of me. It might seem that if we ask if I have the power to lift it,
we've asked the same question. As Funkhouser notes, Erik Wielenberg
has provided an example in which these two questions might seem to
come apart. For if the stone is suitably greased, I might not have the ability
to lift it, even though I would have that ability were it not greased. In such
a case it is natural to say that I have the power to lift the stone (i.e., I am
generally capable of lifting objects of that size and weight) even though I
can't lift the stone (or, as we are not using the expression, I now lack the
ability to lift the stone).
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While I think that Wielenberg's case is telling as far as it goes, I want
to suggest that there are better analogies to argue against the thesis that
what one can do is precisely the same as what one has the power to
bring about. 4
Accounts of omnipotence in particular, and of power in general, in
terms of what states of affairs a being can bring about are misleading in at
least one important way. To see this, let's note that when we care about
such accounts we aren't interested in what states of affairs a being might
bumble into or somehow inadvertently produce. Instead, we are interested in the states of affairs the agent is in a position to bring about via actions. And not just that. For actions can and often to have unintended side
effects. And, again, when we wonder about the abilities or potency of an
agent, we aren't asking about what she might accidentally produce as the
result of an action intended to produce some other end. What we want is
an account of what that being is in a position to bring about intentionally.
It would seem that it will do no harm, even on the view that potency is to
be explicated by what states of affairs the being is capable of producing, if
we instead focus on what we might call' successful acts.' A successful act
is an act that is successful in producing the end to which it is aimed. So if
I have the power to lift a stone, then we can say somewhat more perspicuously, that I can perform the success-act of lifting the stone. Let's assume
that we are only interested in success-acts, and so henceforth, I'll drop the
modifier "success" and speak only of acts.
So I can lift the stone iff I can perform the act of lifting the stone. Let's
suppose furthermore that if I can perform the act of lifting the stone, then
there is some possible world in which I am otherwise much as I am now
and I do lift the stone. 5 So to find out more about what must be the case if
I can in fact lift the stone, we must think about what must happen at these
worlds in which I actually do perform the action of lifting the stone.
Because we are here interested only in actions that produce the effects
at which they aim, we can consider only what must be true in order for
one to perform such an act.
So let's consider this claim:
1:

I can lift a stone weighing 100 pounds

Now given our necessary and sufficient condition for 'can' statements it
follows that
2:

I can perform the act of lifting a stone weighing 100 pounds.

And given our necessary condition for performing an action it follows that
3:

There is a world W at which I am much as I am now where I perform the act of lifting a stone weighing 100 pounds.

But what does (3) require? That a pair of conditions obtain: I must have
the capacity to lift the 100-pound stone and I must have the all-thingsconsidered will to lift it. If I have only the capacity, the stone will remain
unlifted. If I only have the all-things-considered will, the stone will remain
unlifted. But if I have the all-things-considered will and the capacity; then
I will perform the act of lifting the stone. 6
Therefore we can say that, given (I), (2), and (3) the following is true:
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At W, I have the all-things-considered will to lift the stone and the
capacity to lift the stone.

Let's complicate things just a bit. Suppose I had some horrible experience
with a hot-pink object when 1 was a child that left me with an uncontrollable aversion to hot-pink things. I simply cannot make myself knowingly
touch them. Now let's assume that I regularly lift gray stones weighing
100 pounds. Still, it may occur to us to wonder if the following is true:
5:

I can perform the act of lifting a hot-pink stone weighing 100
pounds.

On the one hand, it seems silly to think that (2) is true but (5) is false. How
could the mere color of the object sap me of my lifting strength? Yet it also
seems true to say that you can't lift an object that you can't touch, and if
I literally can't knowingly touch any hot-pink object, then I can't knowingly touch the stone in question, and so I can't perform the act of lifting
it. Although we might be tempted to think there is a paradox here (I both
can and cannot lift hot-pink stones), this conflict is resolvable using the
distinctions above.
I can lift a stone in Wanly if there is a world where I am fundamentally
like I am in Wand in which 1 lift the stone. Now, given my deep-seeded
aversion to hot-pink objects, there is no world at which I am fundamentally like I am at the actual world (we are supposing) and I lift the hot-pink
stone. So I cannot lift it and (5) is false. However, there is nothing particularly puzzling or paradoxical about this because we are assuming that I
can lift a stone only if I have the capacity for lifting stones of that weight
and an ability to will to lift this particular stone. So my being unable to lift
the stone doesn't entail that I lack the capacity for lifting stones that size or
that I even lack the capacity to lift that stone (since its weight is well within
my lifting range). My inability in this case is a failure of my will and not
my capacity for stone lifting.
So I cannot lift the stone, although I do have the capacity to lift it. Does
thi, mean that I lack the power to lift it? I don't see why. If I have the power
to ]ift a loa-pound gray stone but lack the power to lift a lOa-pound hotpink stone, then these are distinct powers. But why should we think that?
As far as I can see, the only reason to individuate powers this finely is the
conviction that "s cannot do X" entails "s lacks the power to X." But once
we see that the explanation for the former can be a failure of will rather than capacity, we should see that the entailment fails to hold. Indeed,
these considerations might be taken to show that by "capacity" we've really been picking out the very same concept that we pick out when we use
"power" in these contexts.
Now Funkhouser has a response to the kind of reply I've been detailing. Funkhouser thinks that the distinction between (in my terms) what
a being has the ability to will on the one hand and what a being has the
capacity to do on the other is untenable for God. In other intelligent beings, Funkhouser avers, the will and the capacity to do things are distinct
faculties. Regarding the earlier example involving the hot-pink rock, we
can say that qua the faculty of the will, I cannot lift it but qua my capacity
for lifting, I can. Yet in God there is not supposed to be any such distinction between faculties; the doctrine of divine simplicity requires a lack of
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complexity in the mind and will of God. Instead of talking of two distinct
faculties, then, we must speak of God's "will-power" -a combination of
what God is able to will and has the capacity to do. What God can do is
what God has the will-power to do. So if there are things God is unable
to do, the explanation must be simply that God lacks the will-power, and
not that, for example, God has the capacity to do them but lacks the will.
Therefore, if God cannot do something, God simply lacks the will-power
to do it.
My reply to this is two-fold. Although the doctrine of simplicity has
been a historically important doctrine in Christian theism, it no longer
holds the sway it once held over theologians. So if cornered, a theist might
be willing to grant whatever complexity is necessary for a separation of
God's will and God's capacities.
However (and this is the second part of my reply) such a concession
isn't necessary. Suppose with Funkhouser that the literal, metaphysical
truth is that God has neither will nor capacity but has instead the joint
will-power. So, given our earlier example, there are no worlds at which
this will-power extends to the stabbing of innocent children. But there are
worlds at which it extends to the stabbing of physically similar beings of
the same size and consistency. Furthermore, there are worlds at which
God destroys entire galaxies but none at which his destroying such galaxies fails to be morally justified. Given a thorough description of all worlds
consistent with God's will-power and those inconsistent with God's willpower, we will be able to see that the former set will be exactly the same
as the set of worlds that would be consistent with God's having distinct
faculties in virtue of which God is omnipotent and impeccable. And the
latter will be the very same set as the set that is inconsistent with God's
having those distinct faculties. But since even Funkhouser seems willing
to grant that God would be omnipotent and impeccable were God's will
and God's capacities distinct, and since uniting the faculties does nothing
to limit or expand the worlds and actions open to God, we should surely
conclude that God is omnipotent and impeccable even if God's will and
power are united. That is, Funkhouser claims that because of the doctrine
of simplicity, God can't be both omnipotent and impeccable; but if we hold
everything else the same except for the unity of God's will and capacity,
then omnipotence and impeccability are compossible. Yet it is hard to see
how the unity of God's will and capacity could somehow deprive God of
power given that the separation of the will and power would have made
no difference at all with respect to which worlds might have been actual.
Therefore, we should conclude that divine simplicity does not provide
Funkhouser with a satisfactory reply to the objection to premise two of
his original. Hence we should conclude that the objection holds and that
"God cannot do X" fails to entail that "God lacks the power to do X."
Hence we should fail to conclude that there is a conflict between omnipotence and impeccability?
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NOTES
1. I'm here assuming that the Anselmian conception of God entails that
if God exists, then God is the most powerful being at any world at which he
exists and that he exists at all worlds. Of course, this entailment only holds
if, necessarily, being necessarily existent and the most powerful being at all
worlds at which the being exists are possibly exemplified, compossible, and
jointly better to have than to lack. Funkhouser would, I believe, reject this entailment of the Anselmian conception but for the present it will do no harm to
suppose, with the standard Anselmian, that this entailment holds.
2. Funkhouser, p. 416.
3. For more on this limited modal skepticism, see Peter van Inwagen's paper "Modal Epistemology" in Philosophical Studies 92 (1998), pp. 67-84.
i. In what follows, I am indebted to Thomas V. Morris's discussion in
chapter 4 (liThe Power of God") of his book Our Idea of God (Notre Dame Press,
1991).
J.
It should be noted the qualification "I am much like I am now" is needed to avoid the consequence that a quadriplegic is able to lift a 100-pound
stone. I take it that even though the quadriplegic can lift the stone in worlds at
which he isn't a quadriplegic, that shouldn't incline us to say that he can lift a
stone in those worlds at which he is a quadriplegic.
6. To say that the combination of capacity and all-things-considered desire is sufficient for my performing the action is an oversimplification, and for
more than one reason. First, there may be cases involving weakness of will
or depression in which it would be natural to say both that a person has the
capacity and all-things-considered desire to X but nevertheless fails to X. Second, one may have the all-things-considered desire and the capacity yet fail
to do X because she can't accomplish X each time she tries. To borrow from J.
L. Austin's example, a golfer might have the desire to sink a difficult 40 foot
putt, and, being an accomplished golfer, have the capacity to make it but lack
the ability to sink it every time she tries. Both kinds of problems show that
more would need to be said if my aim here were to give a satisfactory account
of agency. But these kinds of difficulties are presumably not relevant for the
purpose at hand and so it will suffice to make note of them and move on.
7. Thanks to Eric Funkhouser for discussion and detailed comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.

